Quantitative Economics
Journal Of The Econometric Society
Edited by: Stéphane Bonhomme • Print ISSN: 1759-7323 • Online ISSN: 1759-7331
Edited by: Stéphane Bonhomme • Print ISSN: 1759-7323 • Online ISSN: 1759-7331
Quantitative Economics: Jul, 2018, Volume 9, Issue 2
Strategic interaction parameters characterize the impact of actions of one economic agent on the payoff of another economic agent, and are of great interest in both theoretical and empirical work. In this paper, by considering econometric models involving simultaneous discrete systems of equations, we study how the information available to economic agents regarding other economic agents can influence whether or not these strategic information parameters can be inferred from the observed actions. We consider two extreme cases: the complete information case where the information sets of participating economic agents coincide and the incomplete information case where each agent's payoffs are privately observable. We find that in models with complete information, the strategic interaction parameters are more difficult to recover than they are in incomplete information models. We show this by exploring the Fisher information (from standard statistics literature) for the strategic interaction parameters in each of these models. Our findings are that in complete information models, the statistical (Fisher) information for the interaction parameters is zero, implying the difficulty in recovering them from data. In contrast, for incomplete information models, the Fisher information for the interaction parameters is positive, indicating that not only can these parameters be relatively easy to recover from data, but standard inference can be conducted on them. This finding is illustrated in two cases: treatment effect models (expressed as a triangular system of equations) and static game models.
Endogenous discrete response treatment effects static game strategic interaction C13 C14 C25 C35
March 5, 2024
The terms of the Editors of the Econometric Society's three journals end June 30, 2025. We are pleased to announce the incoming Editors and to thank the outgoing Editors for their excellent and continuing service.
Econometrica: Since 2019, Guido Imbens has served as the 14th Editor of Econometrica. On July 1, 2025, Marina Halac will become the Editor.
Quantitative Economics: Stéphane Bonhomme has been the Editor of Quantitative Economics since 2021. His successor will be Bernard Salanié.
Theoretical Economics: The Editor of Theoretical Economics since 2021 has been Simon Board. Taking over for him in July 2025 will be Federico Echenique.
Guido, Stéphane, and Simon have been outstanding Editors. We are grateful to them for the work they have done and will continue to do, and we look forward to further congratulating them next year. We believe Marina, Bernard, and Federico will be outstanding successors and we thank them in advance for their service.
Finally, we are grateful to Larry Samuelson for chairing all three search committees, and we thank the search committee members for their hard and fruitful work:
Econometrica: Christian Dustmann, Lars Hansen, Alessandro Lizzeri, George Mailath, Ariel Pakes, Helene Rey, and Elie Tamer.
QE: Kate Ho, Michael Keane, Felix Kubler, Whitney Newey, and Frank Schorfheide.
TE: Jeff Ely, Johannes Horner, Gilat Levy, Meg Meyer, and Ran Spiegler.